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Abstract	
What	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 risk?	 Risk	 can	 impose	 distinctive	 burdens	 on	
individuals:	making	 us	 anxious,	 impairing	 our	 relationships,	 and	 limiting	 our	 ability	 to	
plan	our	lives.	On	the	other	hand,	risky	situations	are	sometimes	exciting,	liberating,	and	
even	empowering.	The	article	explores	 the	 idea	 that	 risk	 can	 result	 in	benefits	 for	 the	
individuals	who	bear	it.	Specifically,	we	evaluate	John	Tomasi’s	claim	that	the	experience	
of	economic	risk	 is	a	precondition	of	 individual	self-respect.	Philosophical	claims	about	
the	 social	bases	of	 self-respect	 such	as	Tomasi’s	have	not	been	 subjected	 to	 sufficient	
empirical	 scrutiny.	 The	 article	 exemplifies	 an	 alternative	 approach,	 by	 integrating	
philosophical	 argument	 with	 the	 analysis	 of	 large-scale	 survey	 data.	 Whilst	 Tomasi’s	
claim	has	force	 in	some	contexts,	evidence	from	the	economic	domain	shows	that	risk	
tends	to	undermine	rather	than	to	support	self-respect.	
Key	words:	risk,	self-respect,	empirical	political	philosophy	
	
What	is	the	nature	of	the	experience	of	risk?	In	other	words,	what	is	it	like	to	live	with	
the	 possibility,	 but	 not	 certainty,	 that	 some	 adverse	 future	 event	 will	 occur?	 On	 one	
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account,	risk	is	harmful	even	when	the	potential	negative	outcomes	do	not	materialize:	
it	provokes	anxiety,	 limits	 individual	choice,	and	constrains	our	ability	to	plan	our	 lives.	
Consider	two	individuals	who	enjoy	an	equal	standard	of	housing,	except	that	one	has	a	
secure	 tenancy	and	 the	other	could	be	evicted	at	 short-notice.2	Now	 imagine	 that	 the	
insecure	 tenant	 is,	 in	 fact,	 never	 required	 to	 leave.	 From	one	perspective,	 the	 lives	of	
these	individuals	have,	in	the	end,	gone	the	same.	Nevertheless,	we	can	see	that	there	
are	 some	 important	 respects	 in	 which	 the	 insecure	 tenant	 is	 disadvantaged.	 For	
example,	she	may	suffer	psychological	distress	at	the	prospect	of	 losing	her	home.	She	
may	 also,	 with	 good	 reason,	 not	 invest	 in	 building	 relationships	 within	 her	 local	
community.	We	can	imagine	similar	cases	involving	insecurity	in	people’s	status	or	access	
to	resources	across	a	range	of	domains,	such	as	employment,	immigration	or	healthcare.	
Even	when	the	possible	adverse	events	do	not	occur,	the	experience	of	insecurity	itself	
has	the	capacity	to	damage	people’s	lives,	sometimes	in	profound	ways.3	
There	 is,	 however,	 a	 contrasting	 story	we	 can	 tell	 about	 the	experience	of	 risk.	Risk	 is	
sometimes	 exciting.	 But	 more	 than	 this,	 risky	 situations	 can	 be	 liberating	 and	
empowering;	 they	 offer	 us	 opportunities	 to	 exercise	 agency,	 to	 test	 ourselves	 and	 to	
develop	 self-control.	 Thus	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 wholly	 secure	 life	 will	 seem	 dull	 and	
oppressive	 to	many.	Moreover,	we	 voluntarily	 undertake	 risky	 activities,	 sometimes	 in	
part	 because	 they	 are	 risky.4	Whether	 the	 experience	 of	 risk	 is	 one	 of	 excitement	 or	
																																								 																				
2	 Wolff	2009,	217.	
3	 	On	harms	stemming	from	unrealized	risks,	see	Perry	2007,	198-9;	Wolff	and	de-Shalit	2007,	65-73.	
4	 On	the	goods	of	risk,	see	Giddens	1991,	132-33;	Lupton	and	Tulloch	2002,	113-24.	
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anxiety,	of	power	or	powerlessness,	the	implication	is	that	we	cannot	judge	how	well-off	
people	 are	 simply	 by	 assessing	 the	 goods	 that	 they	 currently	 possess;	 rather	 ‘one’s	
present	well-being	must	make	reference	to	future	states	by	means	of	the	notions	of	risk	
and	 insecurity	 or	 vulnerability’.5	However,	we	have	 two	 very	 different	 perspectives	 on	
the	 direction	 in	 which	 this	 observation	 takes	 our	 thinking	 about	 justice.	 On	 the	 first	
account	risk	compounds	disadvantage,	whereas	the	second	vision	suggests	that	risk	can	
lead	to	benefits	for	the	individuals	who	bear	it.	
These	two	broad	visions	of	risk	provide	the	starting	point	 for	this	paper.	Each	of	 these	
accounts	surely	captures	something	true	about	the	role	of	risk	in	human	experience.	The	
challenge	is	to	specify	more	precisely	the	different	types	of	benefits	and	burdens	of	risk,	
for	 various	 forms	 of	 risk,	 in	 distinct	 contexts.	 The	 paper	 contributes	 to	 this	 task	 by	
exploring	 a	 version	 of	 the	 second	 ‘risk	 as	 a	 good’	 account	 that	 is	 advanced	 by	 John	
Tomasi	 in	 Free	 Market	 Fairness.	 Specifically,	 we	 evaluate	 Tomasi’s	 claim	 that	 the	
‘experience	of	risk	seems	to	be	an	essential	precondition	of	the	sort	of	self-respect	that	
liberals	 value’.6	 In	 Rawlsian	 terms,	 Tomasi	 suggests	 that	 economic	 arrangements	 that	
expose	 individuals	 to	 risk	are	among	the	social	bases	of	 self-respect:	 ‘those	aspects	of	
basic	institutions	normally	essential	if	citizens	are	to	have	a	lively	sense	of	their	worth	as	
persons	and	to	be	able	to	advance	their	ends	with	self-confidence’.7	Thus	he	alleges	that	
left	 liberals,	 in	 advocating	 welfare	 and	 labour	 market	 policies	 that	 provide	 greater	
																																								 																				
5	 Wolff	2009,	217.	
6	 Tomasi	2012,	80.	
7	 Rawls	2001,	59.	
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economic	 security,	would	undermine	 the	 conditions	 for	 the	 realization	of	one	of	 their	
own	most	fundamental	values.	
Our	 motivation	 for	 focussing	 on	 Tomasi	 is	 twofold.	 First,	 he	 advances	 an	 interesting	
substantive	claim	about	the	benefits	of	economic	risk,	which	opens	up	important	wider	
questions	 about	 how	 individuals	 experience	 diverse	 forms	 of	 risk.	 Secondly,	 Tomasi	
offers	 an	 appealing	 vision	 of	 how	 to	 do	 political	 philosophy;	 an	 account	 on	which	we	
build	our	theory	starting	from	the	observation	of	everyday	human	experience.	He	warns	
us	that	the	passion	for	idealization	‘can	make	philosophers	impervious	to	moral	learning.	
Their	methodological	impulse	is	to	climb	up	and	away	from	the	experiences	of	ordinary	
citizens,	rather	than	to	come	down	and	listen	closely	to	them’.8	However,	Tomasi	fails	to	
make	 good	 on	 this	 bottom-up	methodological	 vision,	 since	 he	 does	 not	 engage	 with	
empirical	 evidence	 about	 the	 impact	 of	 economic	 risk	 on	 individual	 self-concept.	 The	
paper	takes	up	Tomasi’s	suggested	method	by	presenting	new	analyses	of	Health	Survey	
for	England	(HSE)	and	British	Household	Panel	Survey	(BHPS)	data.	Thus	we	exemplify	a	
more	empirically-based	approach	to	philosophical	debate	about	the	social	bases	of	self-
respect.	
Our	 results	 show	 that	 economic	 risk	 tends	 to	 undermine	 rather	 than	 to	 support	 self-
respect.	However,	the	paper	also	identifies	qualitative	evidence	linking	the	experience	of	
risk,	in	a	variety	of	forms,	with	the	development	of	positive	self-attitudes	and	emotions.	
We	explain	these	divergent	findings	by	identifying	a	number	of	crucial	dimensions	along	
																																								 																				
8	 Tomasi	2012,	214.	See	also	60-68.	
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which	 risky	 situations	 differ,	 to	 which	 Tomasi’s	 account	 is	 not	 sensitive.	 Thus,	 whilst	
Tomasi	appeals	to	a	vision	of	risk	that	has	force	in	some	contexts,	the	evidence	does	not	
support	his	case	against	welfare	and	labour	market	policies	that	offer	greater	security	in	
the	economic	sphere.	
A	few	preliminary	remarks	are	needed	here	about	the	complex	and	contested	notion	of	
risk.	Here	we	 conceptualize	a	 risky	 situation	as	a	 context	 in	which	an	 individual	 faces,	
and	is	aware	that	she	faces,	the	possibility	of	an	adverse	future	event.	We	are	interested	
in	how	people	experience	downside	risks	in	the	pre-outcome	phase;	in	other	words,	we	
investigate	the	effects	of	risk	itself,	independently	of	how	those	risks	play	out.	Of	course,	
many	risks	also	involve	potential	gains,	and	there	is	an	obvious	sense	in	which	risks	are	
good	 for	 people	 when	 such	 benefits	 are	 realized.	 Moreover,	 it	 seems	 likely	 that	 the	
period	 of	 insecurity	 itself	 will	 be	 experienced	 differently	 when	 there	 is	 a	 potential	
upside.	However,	our	focus	on	downside	risks	is	consistent	with	Tomasi’s	account	of	the	
janitor	 case	 (see	 section	 I)	 and	 with	 his	 critique	 of	 welfare	 provision	more	 generally.	
Tomasi’s	intriguing	suggestion	is	that	there	is	an	important	good	to	be	realized	through	
experiencing	the	possibility	of	something	bad	happening	to	us.	Secondly,	we	note	that	a	
distinction	is	commonly	drawn	between	risk	and	uncertainty:	where	a	risky	situation	is	
one	in	which	we	do	not	know	what	will	happen,	but	we	can	attach	probabilities	to	the	
various	possible	outcomes;	 in	a	situation	of	uncertainty	we	are	unable	even	to	identify	
the	relevant	probabilities.	The	types	of	economic	threats	we	consider	represent	neither	
instances	of	pure	risk,	in	which	we	have	secure	knowledge	of	the	relevant	probabilities,	
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nor	cases	of	pure	uncertainty,	 in	which	we	lack	any	credible	 information	with	which	to	
estimate	probabilities.	We	prefer	the	term	risk	to	describe	these	intermediate	cases.	
A	third	central	problem	in	the	definition	of	risk	concerns	the	distinction	between	actual	
and	perceived	risk.	As	the	reference	to	awareness	in	the	above	definition	implies,	if	we	
are	 interested	 in	 the	 impact	 of	 risk	 on	 self-concept,	we	 are	 inevitably	 involved	 in	 the	
domain	 of	 perceptions.9	 This	 invites	 the	 objection	 that	 we	 are	 catering	 to	 subjective	
responses	 to	 risk,	 which,	 we	 know	 from	 a	 large	 body	 of	 research,	 exhibit	 various	
problematic	irrationalities.10	We	have	two	responses	to	this	concern.	First,	the	objection	
is	less	pressing	in	the	economic	domain	with	which	we	are	concerned,	where	there	is	a	
consensus	in	the	empirical	literature	that	subjective	worries	are	responsive	to	the	actual	
rates	of	 occurrence	of	 adverse	 events.		 Across	 individuals,	 the	 experience	of	 objective	
economic	shocks	leads	to	greater	feelings	of	insecurity	in	terms	of	job	loss,	wealth,	and	
health.11	 Across	 countries	 and	 over	 time,	 subjective	 employment	 insecurity	 closely	
tracks	the	unemployment	rate.12	Secondly,	we	are	focussed	here	on	how	risk	shapes	self-
respect,	not	yet	on	the	further	question	of	what	we	ought	to	do	in	response	to	any	such	
connections.	 Thus	 we	 do	 not	 deny	 the	 need	 for	 some	 criteria	 of	 epistemic	
reasonableness	when	thinking	about	action	to	secure	the	social	bases	of	self-respect.	
																																								 																				
9	 Thus	we	are	not	dealing	with	cases	of	‘pure	risk’,	in	the	sense	of	risk	that	is	both	unrecognized	and	
unrealized.	On	the	moral	status	of	pure	risk,	see	Finkelstein	2003;	Oberdiek	2017;	Perry	2007,	200-2.	
10	 See,	for	example,	Sunstein	2005.	
11	 Hacker,	Rehm	and	Schlesinger	2013;	Jacobs	and	Newman	2008,	82-9.	
12	 Green	2009.	
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The	 remainder	 of	 the	 paper	 proceeds	 in	 four	 main	 parts.	 Section	 I	 unpacks	 Tomasi’s	
argument	linking	risk	with	the	attainment	of	self-respect.	Specifically,	we	identify	three	
mechanisms	through	which	the	experience	of	risk	might	further	individual	self-respect.	II	
discusses	some	existing	evidence	that	bears	on	the	question	of	the	relationship	between	
risk	 and	 self-respect,	 as	 well	 as	 presenting	 our	 new	 analyses	 of	 HSE	 and	 BHPS	 data.	
Whilst	 some	 qualitative	 research	 reveals	 the	 benefits	 of	 risk	 for	 self-worth	 and	
confidence,	 our	 analyses	 show	a	 consistently	 negative	 relationship	 between	economic	
risk	 and	 self-respect.	 III	 explains	 our	 pattern	 of	 findings	 by	 outlining	 some	 key	
dimensions	 along	 which	 risky	 situations	 differ,	 which	 in	 turn	 shape	 how	 risk	 is	
experienced.	 IV	 briefly	 addresses	 a	 potential	 objection	 to	 our	 empirically-based	
approach	to	philosophical	debate	about	the	social	bases	of	self-respect.	
I.	TOMASI	ON	RISK	AS	A	PRECONDITION	OF	SELF-RESPECT	
Tomasi’s	 claim	 that	 risk	 underpins	 self-respect	 is	 advanced	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 wider	
project,	one	of	whose	central	aims	is	to	show	that	a	wide	range	of	economic	freedoms	
should	 be	 accorded	 the	 status	 of	 basic	 liberties.	 On	 Rawls’s	 view,	 only	 freedom	 of	
occupational	choice	and	the	right	to	own	private	property	belong	in	this	category,	on	a	
par	 with	 civil	 and	 political	 liberties.	 Further	 questions	 about	 the	 organization	 of	 the	
economy,	 such	 as	 the	 ownership	 of	 productive	 property,	 are	 to	 be	 determined	 at	 the	
legislative	stage	and	shaped	by	a	society’s	particular	circumstances	and	history.13	Tomasi	
argues	 that	 this	 restrictive	 Rawlsian	 account	 is	 guilty	 of	 unjustified	 ‘economic	
																																								 																				
13	 Rawls	1982,	53.	
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exceptionalism’	and	we	 should	admit	 a	much	wider	 range	of	basic	economic	 liberties,	
including	the	right	to	work	the	number	of	hours	I	choose,	to	negotiate	the	pay	for	which	
I	work,	to	own	productive	property	and	to	decide	how	much	to	save	for	healthcare	or	for	
my	children’s	education.	Although	not	absolute,	this	broader	set	of	economic	freedoms	
should	 receive	 constitutional	 protection	 and	 ought	 to	 be	 limited	 only	 for	 the	 sake	 of	
securing	other	basic	 liberties.	This	argument	for	 ‘thick	economic	 liberty’	 is	 intended	to	
challenge	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 policies	 that	 Tomasi	 associates	 with	 ‘European	 social	
democracy’:	 various	 forms	 of	 labour	 market	 regulation,	 as	 well	 as	 social	 security	
provision	and	extensive	redistributive	taxation.14	
Tomasi	most	often	grounds	the	case	for	an	extensive	set	of	economic	basic	 liberties	 in	
the	idea	of	‘responsible	self-authorship’:	the	value	of	individuals	assessing,	choosing	and	
pursuing	their	own	life	goals.	He	also	repeatedly	emphasizes	the	need	for	one	to	be,	and	
to	 think	 of	 oneself	 as,	 ‘the	 central	 cause	 of	 the	 life	 one	 is	 leading’.15	 A	wide	 range	of	
economic	 liberties	 are	 said	 to	 be	 crucial	 to	 our	 self-authorship	 and	 sense	 of	 self-as-
cause:	
‘A	 society	 that	 denies	 people	 the	 chance	 to	 take	 up	 questions	 of	 long-term	
financial	planning	for	themselves,	or	that	restricts	the	ways	in	which	individuals	
and	 families	can	 respond	to	such	questions,	 thereby	diminishes	 the	capacity	of	
citizens	 to	 become	 fully	 responsible	 and	 independent	 agents.	 So	 too	 a	 society	
																																								 																				
14	 Tomasi	2012,	216.	Tomasi	argues	that	his	theory	does	leave	room	for	a	minimal	safety	net.	But	it	is	
difficult	to	see	how	this	claim	fits	with	his	view	that	the	economic	liberties	are	basic.	
15	 Tomasi	2012,	83.	
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that	 limits	 the	 freedom	 of	 individuals	 to	 negotiate	 the	 specific	 terms	 of	 their	
employment,	 or	 that	makes	 their	 ownership	 of	 productive	 property	 subject	 to	
calculations	about	social	expediency,	no	matter	how	benevolent	their	intentions	
in	 doing	 so,	 thereby	 creates	 social	 conditions	 in	 which	 the	 moral	 powers	 of	
citizens	can	be	exercised	and	developed	in	only	a	stunted	way’.16	
Tomasi’s	 argument	 rests	 on	 a	 false	 dichotomy	 between	 state	 coercion	 on	 economic	
matters	on	the	one	hand,	and	free	exercise	of	 individual	agency	on	the	other:	 there	 is	
little	 recognition	of	 the	 reality	of	coercion	by	non-state	actors.	For	example,	he	claims	
that	 in	 a	 society	 in	 which	 employment	 hours	 and	 pay	 are	 highly	 socially	 regulated,	
‘citizens	would	 no	 longer	 be	 authors	 of	 their	 own	 lives.	 Decisions	 about	matters	 that	
affect	them	intimately	would	have	been	taken	out	of	their	hands	and	decided	for	them	
by	others’.17	But	he	does	not	adequately	address	the	ways	 in	which,	 in	 the	absence	of	
regulation,	such	decisions	are	taken	out	of	the	hands	of	many	individual	citizens	in	the	
face	 of	 the	 power	 of	 employers	 and	 limited	 choice	 within	 the	 labour	 market.	 Thus	
Tomasi’s	 own	 arguments	 about	 the	 importance	 of	 individuals	 being	 able	 to	 exercise	
agency	in	the	economic	domain	point	towards	a	more	expansive	role	for	the	state	in	the	
economy	than	he	wishes	to	admit.18	
Given	 the	difficulties	with	Tomasi’s	 self-authorship	argument,	we	 treat	his	 claim	about	
the	value	of	risk	as	an	interesting	alternative	way	of	framing	the	case	for	thick	economic	
																																								 																				
16	 Tomasi	2012,	80-81.	
17	 Tomasi	2012,	77.	
18	 On	the	freedom-constraining	effects	of	free	markets,	see	Cohen	2016;	Gourevitch	2014;	Gowder	2014.	
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liberty.19	Whilst	Tomasi	himself	slides	between	claims	about	self-authorship	and	risk,	the	
two	 notions	 are	 not	 identical.	 	 For	 example,	 consider	 a	 free	market	 society	 in	 which	
economic	 risk	 is	 low	 due	 to	 the	 structure	 of	 people’s	 skills	 and	 preferences.	 Or	 think	
about	a	case	in	which	individuals	voluntarily	purchase	comprehensive	insurance	against	
economic	 risk.20	 In	 these	 examples,	 individuals	 are	missing	 the	 ongoing	 experience	 of	
economic	insecurity,	but	others	do	not	act	to	undermine	their	economic	self-authorship	
in	the	way	that	Tomasi	finds	problematic.	What	would	Tomasi	say	to	these	cases?	Would	
he	see	a	risk-free	economic	 life	as	problematic,	even	if	 it	arose	without	 interference	 in	
the	exercise	of	individual	economic	agency?	Since	Tomasi	does	not	explicitly	distinguish	
his	claims	about	the	value	of	the	experience	of	risk	from	his	arguments	about	economic	
self-authorship,	we	do	not	have	a	firm	answer	to	this	question.	However,	to	some	extent	
our	exploration	of	the	relationship	between	risk	and	self-respect	 is	 independent	of	the	
interpretive	 issue;	we	treat	Tomasi’s	remarks	about	the	value	of	risk	as	 interesting	and	
worth	further	examination	in	their	own	right.	
But	 why	 and	 how	 might	 risk	 underpin	 self-respect	 and,	 conversely,	 how	 might	 the	
absence	 of	 risk	 undermine	 self-respect?	 Following	 Charles	Murray,	 Tomasi	 introduces	
the	 example	 of	 an	 individual	who	works	 as	 a	 janitor	 and	 thereby	 supports	 his	 family:	
‘Such	people,	Murray	suggests,	are	doing	something	genuinely	important	with	their	lives	
…	 If	those	same	people	lived	under	a	system	in	which	they	were	heavily	 insulated	from	
																																								 																				
19	 Depending	on	how	we	fill	out	the	risk	argument	(see	below),	the	idea	of	individual	agency	may	come	
back	in.	But	it	is	helpful,	in	the	first	instance,	to	separate	the	claim	about	risk	from	that	about	self-
authorship.	
20	 We	are	grateful	to	Matthew	Clayton	for	suggesting	these	cases.	
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economic	 risk,	 for	 example,	 by	 being	 assured	 that	 they	 and	 their	 children	will	 be	well	
provided	for	whether	or	not	they	themselves	contribute,	then	that	status	goes	away’.21	In	
what	ways	is	the	status	of	the	janitor	undermined	in	the	context	of	a	welfare	system	that	
provides	him	and	his	 family	with	economic	security?	More	generally,	why	 is	 it	 that	 ‘By	
insulating	 people	 from	 economic	 risks,	 the	 European	 model	 denies	 ordinary	 citizens	
opportunities	 to	 feel	 the	 special	 sense	 that	 they	 have	 done	 something	 genuinely	
important	with	their	lives’?22	
The	 claim	 that	 the	 experience	 of	 economic	 risk	 enhances	 self-respect	 initially	 looks	
puzzling.	How	can	the	threat	that	something	bad	will	happen	to	us	be	good	for	our	sense	
of	 self?23	 In	 order	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 Tomasi’s	 claim,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 distinguish	 three	
potential	mechanisms	linking	risk	with	greater	self-respect.	First,	risk	might	have	a	direct	
positive	impact	on	individual	self-concept.	Perhaps	facing	an	unknown	future	gives	us	a	
keener	sense	of	our	own	agency.	The	experience	of	 risk	might	also	cause	us	 to	 reflect	
further	on	our	commitments.	In	this	way,	our	goals	will	become	more	our	own	and	we	
																																								 																				
21	 Tomasi	2012,	80.	
22	 Tomasi	2012,	80.	A	more	radical	right-wing	view	holds	that	failure	(as	opposed	to	risk)	is	a	good	that	is	
denied	people	by	the	welfare	state.	This,	we	take	it,	is	not	Tomasi’s	view.	Thus,	as	we	understand	it,	
Tomasi’s	claim	about	the	value	of	risk	does	not	represent	an	all-things-considered	defence	of	risk-
exposing	economic	arrangements.	This	would	require	that	we	also	weigh	the	implications	of	how	risks	
turn	out,	for	self-respect	and	for	other	values.	
23		 There	is	a	particular	puzzle	about	how	subjective	economic	risk	(expecting	things	to	go	badly	in	
economic	terms)	could	be	positively	related	to	confidence	(or	expecting	one’s	plans	to	be	fulfilled).	
Within	our	analysis	the	tension	is	less	acute	than	it	might	appear,	since	the	measures	apply	to	different	
domains:	subjective	risk	relates	to	the	economic	sphere	(specifically	to	job	security),	whereas	our	
confidence	measure	is	global.	For	example,	perhaps	as	my	sense	that	my	job	is	insecure	increases,	this	
might	lead	me	to	work	harder	and	thereby	gain	confidence	about	my	abilities	and	prospects	in	life	in	
general.	We	thank	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	drawing	our	attention	to	this	potential	tension.	
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may	come	to	value	them	more	highly	in	the	face	of	the	possibility	that	they	will	not	be	
realized.	 Secondly,	 the	 beneficial	 effects	 of	 risk	 on	 self-respect	might	 be	mediated	 by	
behaviour.	Understood	in	this	way,	Tomasi’s	claim	is	that	individuals	act	differently	when	
they	 are	 insecure	 and,	 specifically,	 they	 behave	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 conducive	 to	 the	
development	or	maintenance	of	self-respect.	For	example,	perhaps	people	work	harder	
under	risk	and	thereby	gain	 in	confidence	or	 reinforce	their	sense	of	 their	own	worth.	
Thirdly,	 we	 should	 consider	 the	 social	 meaning	 of	 risk:	 when	 an	 individual	 or	
organization	exposes	us	to,	or	declines	to	protect	us	against,	avoidable	risk	they	express	
something	about	how	they	 regard	us.	Specifically,	allowing	an	 individual	 to	bear	a	 risk	
can	be	a	way	of	communicating	trust	and	confidence	in	her	capacities	that	may,	in	turn,	
reinforce	her	self-confidence.	Tomasi	evokes	this	picture	of	the	expressive	dimension	of	
risk	when	 he	 asks:	 ‘How	 can	 individuals	 have	 self-respect	 if	 their	 fellow	 citizens	 deny	
them	the	right	to	decide	for	themselves	how	many	hours	they	will	work	each	week	and	
under	 what	 precise	 terms	 and	 conditions?	 How	 can	 they	 think	 of	 themselves	 as	
esteemed	by	their	fellow	citizens	if	those	citizens	call	on	the	coercive	force	of	the	law	to	
impede	them	in	deciding	for	themselves	how	much	(or	little)	to	save	for	retirement,	the	
minimum	wage	 they	may	 find	 acceptable	 for	 various	 forms	of	work,	 or	 to	 dictate	 the	
parameters	of	the	medical	care	that	will	be	available	to	them?’24		
II.	EMPIRICAL	EVIDENCE	
A.	ECONOMIC	RISK	HARMS	SELF-RESPECT	
																																								 																				
24	 Tomasi	2012,	83-4.	Emphasis	added.	
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We	have	briefly	unpacked	Tomasi’s	claim	to	show	that	there	are	at	least	three	plausible	
pathways	through	which	the	experience	of	economic	risk	might	enhance	individual	self-
respect.	However,	 for	each	of	 the	positive	mechanisms	outlined	above,	 there	 is	also	a	
negative	 story	 we	 can	 tell	 about	 the	 impact	 of	 risk	 on	 self-respect.	 Perhaps	 the	
experience	of	 risk	creates	 feelings	of	helplessness,	 rather	 than	enhancing	our	sense	of	
agency.	 	 In	 the	 face	 of	 risk,	 we	might	 become	 demotivated,	 rather	 than	 driven.	 And	
perhaps	 the	 true	 social	 meaning	 of	 economic	 risk	 is	 an	 expression	 of	 disregard	 and	
devaluing,	 rather	 than	 trust	 and	 confidence.	 In	 order	 to	 adjudicate	 between	 these	
competing	narratives	we	need	to	bring	empirical	evidence	to	bear.	
Empirical	 researchers	 are	 increasingly	 turning	 their	 attention	 to	 questions	 about	 the	
nature	and	consequences	of	economic	insecurity.	For	example,	there	is	growing	interest	
among	 political	 scientists	 in	 how	 perceptions	 and	 experiences	 of	 economic	 insecurity	
shape	policy	attitudes.25	A	more	established	body	of	 research	addresses	 the	 individual	
level	 impact	 of	 job	 insecurity.	We	 have	 long	 known	 that	 job	 loss	 and	 unemployment	
tend	to	be	bad	for	people	in	various	ways,	but	since	the	mid-1980s	researchers	have	also	
sought	to	gauge	the	effects	of	risk	to	one’s	employment	status.	Whilst	individual	findings	
vary,	 the	 overall	 message	 from	 this	 research	 is	 that	 job	 insecurity	 has	 independent	
detrimental	effects	on	employees’	physical	and	mental	health,	sense	of	well-being	and	
																																								 																				
25	 For	example,	Hacker,	Rehm	and	Schlesinger	2013;	Rehm,	Hacker	and	Schlesinger	2012;	Schwander	and	
Häusermann	2013.	
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attitudes	 towards	 their	 job	 and	 organization.26	 Indeed,	 some	 studies	 report	 that	 the	
negative	 effects	 of	 job	 insecurity	 exceed	 those	 of	 job	 loss.	 For	 example,	 in	 their	
longitudinal	 study	 of	 a	 large	 Australian	 organization	 in	which	 jobs	were	 under	 threat,	
Dekker	and	Schaufeli	 conclude	 that	 ‘certainty	about	a	 job	situation	 (even	 if	 that	 is	 the	
unpleasant	certainty	of	having	been	made	redundant)	 is	 less	detrimental	to	a	worker’s	
psychological	health	than	a	situation	of	prolonged	job	insecurity’.27	
What	about	the	impact	of	economic	insecurity	on	self-respect	specifically?	We	have	not	
identified	any	existing	studies	that	directly	set	out	to	test	this	issue.	However,	there	are	
related	 findings	 from	 the	 job	 insecurity	 literature	 that	 speak	 to	 the	 question	 of	 self-
respect.	 Specifically,	 several	 studies	 report	 that	 insecurity	 tends	 to	 lead	 to	 job	 and	
organizational	 withdrawal	 or	 ‘disinvolvement	 syndrome’:	 a	 decrease	 in	 the	 extent	 to	
which	employees	feel	involved	in,	committed	to	or	proud	of	their	organization	and	their	
work.28	The	workplace	is	an	arena	in	which	many	people	find	worth	and	meaning	in	their	
lives,	and	job	insecurity	tends	to	diminish	these	positive	attitudes	and	attachments.	Thus	
the	 limited	available	evidence	suggests	 that	 insecurity	at	work	 threatens	an	 important	
element	of	self-respect.	
																																								 																				
26	 On	adverse	health	effects,	see	Burgard,	Brand	and	House	2009;	Ferrie	et	al.	1998.	On	well-being	and	
job	attitudes,	see	Nolan,	Wichet	and	Burchell	2000.	For	a	meta-analysis	taking	in	a	range	of	
independent	variables,	see	Sverke,	Hellgren	and	Näswall	2002,	242-64.	
27	 Dekker	and	Schaufeli	1995,	61.	
28	 For	example,	Dekker	and	Shaufeli	1995,	58	and	60-61.	Research	suggests	that	there	is	an	emotional	
component	to	disinvolvement	syndrome,	which	goes	beyond	the	rational	reallocation	of	attention	and	
motivation	under	conditions	of	insecurity.	
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We	use	data	 from	the	2011	wave	of	 the	Health	Survey	 for	England	(HSE)29	 to	build	on	
this	existing	research.	The	HSE	is	a	major	public	survey,	focused	primarily	on	population	
health.	 It	 includes	 questions	 on	occupation	 and	perceptions	 of	 job	 security,	which	we	
use	to	construct	 three	measures	of	economic	risk	 (two	measures	of	 job	 insecurity	and	
one	 measure	 of	 income	 insecurity).	 The	 HSE	 also	 contains	 items	 that	 enable	 us	 to	
construct	 an	 index	 that	 captures	 the	 philosophical	 notion	 of	 self-respect	more	 closely	
than	existing	studies.	In	2011,	although	not	in	either	of	the	more	recent	waves,	there	is	
also	 a	 question	 about	 whether	 respondents	 enjoy	 taking	 risks.	 This	 allows	 us	 to	
investigate	 the	more	 positive	 side	 of	 risk	 that	 is	 highlighted	 in	 the	 qualitative	 studies	
discussed	in	Section	E.	Thus,	we	use	the	2011	data	in	preference	to	more	recent	years.	
The	full	sample	 is	 just	over	10,000	respondents.	However,	as	we	are	 interested	 in	risks	
associated	with	employment	we	limit	our	analyses	to	those	currently	in	work	and	most	
of	our	analyses	contain	around	4000	individuals.	
	Since	we	take	Tomasi	as	our	starting	point,	we	follow	him	in	focussing	on	Rawlsian	self-
respect.30	This	involves	two	key	elements:	first	a	sense	of	our	own	worth	and	the	value	
of	 our	 commitments	 and	 life	 plans	 and,	 secondly,	 confidence	 in	 our	 ability	 to	 hold	
																																								 																				
29	Joint	Health	Surveys	Unit	of	NatCen	Social	Research	and	the	Research	Department	of	Epidemiology	and	
Public	Health	at	UCL	(University	College	London)	2011.	
30	 Tomasi	takes	up	Rawls’s	conception	of	self-respect	at	Tomasi	2012,	82.	More	generally,	many	of	
Tomasi’s	arguments	involve	an	internal	critique	of	Rawls;	he	contends	that	Rawlsian-liberals	mistake	
the	economic	requirements	for	the	realisation	of	their	own	values.	In	particular,	he	charges	Rawls	with	
‘unjustified	exceptionalism’	in	his	account	of	the	basic	liberties	and	contends	that	‘the	same	reasons	
that	high-liberals	offer	in	support	of	their	preferred	economic	liberties	apply	with	at	least	as	much	
force	to	the	aspects	of	economic	freedom	they	wish	to	exclude’,	Tomasi	2012,	76.	Thus	Tomasi’s	claim	
about	the	relationship	between	risk	and	self-respect	is	most	plausibly	interpreted	in	terms	of	the	
Rawlsian	notion	of	self-respect.	
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ourselves	to	our	standards	and	to	pursue	our	plans.31	At	times,	Tomasi	does	seem	to	be	
working	with	an	 idea	of	self-respect	that	 is	more	moralized	than	Rawls’s.	For	example,	
he	 claims	 that	 a	 person’s	 self-respect	 is	 diminished	 when	 others	 provide	 her	 with	
‘material	means’,32	but	he	is	apparently	unconcerned	that	transfers	within	families	might	
threaten	self-respect.	This	raises	the	suspicion	that	Tomasi	has,	at	this	point,	lapsed	into	
a	 moralized	 notion	 of	 self-respect	 that	 assumes	 a	 prior	 theory	 of	 rights:	 a	 theory	
according	 to	 which	 people	 have	 a	 right	 to	 inherit	 from	 family	 members	 but	 not	 to	
extensive	 state	 provision.	 However,	 this	 moralized	 notion	 is	 problematic	 given	 the	
justificatory	 purpose	 that	 the	 idea	 of	 self-respect	 is	 intended	 to	 fulfil.	 Specifically,	 the	
appeal	to	self-respect	is	supposed	to	do	work	in	showing	that	a	wide	array	of	economic	
freedoms	should	be	elevated	to	the	status	of	basic	liberties.	Thus	Tomasi	must	resist	the	
temptation	 to	 define	 self-respect	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 system	 of	 rights	 it	 is	 supposed	 to	
justify.33	 Rawls’s	 conception	 of	 self-respect	 is	 suitably	 non-moralized	 for	 Tomasi’s	
purposes,	since	it	does	not	build	in	a	specific	account	of	the	basic	liberties.	
Using	the	HSE,	we	identify	respondents	as	either	having	or	lacking	self-respect	based	on	
their	 answers	 to	 questions	 about	whether	 they	 feel	 good	 about	 themselves,	 and	 feel	
useful	 (corresponding	 to	 the	 dimension	 of	 self-	 and	 plan-worth)	 and	 about	 their	
confidence	and	ability	to	deal	with	problems	(corresponding	to	belief	 in	their	ability	to	
pursue	 their	 chosen	 life	 plan).	 To	 be	 coded	 as	 having	 self-respect,	 respondents	 must	
																																								 																				
31	 Rawls	1999,	386.	
32	 Tomasi	2012,	83.	
33	 Cf.	Massey’s	critique	of	Feinberg	–	Massey	1983,	257.	
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report	feeling	good	about	themselves,	useful,	confident	and	dealing	with	problems	well,	
either	 ‘often’	 or	 ‘all	 of	 the	 time’.34	 It	might	 be	 objected	 here	 that	 feeling	 good	 about	
myself	 is	not	 the	same	as	having	a	sense	of	my	worth	and	the	worth	of	my	plans.	For	
example,	 I	 could	 have	 positive	 feelings	 about	 myself	 because	 of	 something	 I	 have	
achieved,	 whilst	 lacking	 the	more	 basic	 sense	 of	 my	 worth	 as	 a	 person	 that	 is	 a	 key	
element	 of	 self-respect.	 Our	 response	 to	 this	 worry	 is	 partly	 conceptual	 and	 partly	
empirical.	 On	 the	 conceptual	 side,	 feeling	 good	 about	 oneself	 and	 feeling	 useful	
together	capture	at	least	part	of	the	Rawlsian	notion	of	self-worth.	Whilst	the	measures	
are	not	perfect,	they	come	closer	than	any	existing	outcomes	in	the	literature	on	risk	and	
they	 represent	 an	 improvement	 on	 speculative	 claims	 about	 the	 social	 bases	 of	 self-
respect.	 On	 the	 empirical	 side,	 other	 studies	 report	 a	 strong	 correlation	 between	
indicators	of	positive	feelings	about	oneself	and	indicators	of	self-worth.35	This	provides	
some	reassurance	that	our	results	are	not	substantively	different	from	those	that	would	
be	obtained	with	a	more	direct	measure	of	‘worth	as	a	person’.	
																																								 																				
34	 	We	choose	this	binary	operationalisation	as	it	most	closely	matches	the	original	Rawlsian	formulation	
of	(adequate)	self-respect	as	something	that	a	person	may	either	have	or	lack.	However,	the	results	
presented	here	are	substantively	identical	if	we	use	an	index	measure,	where	answers	to	each	of	the	
four	questions	above	contribute	to	self-respect	in	an	additive	way	(with	responses	of	‘None	of	the	
time’	scoring	1;	‘Rarely’,	2;	up	to	‘All	of	the	time’,	5).	A	second	issue	is	that	the	philosophical	notion	of	
self-respect	is	perhaps	not	closely	tied	to	the	frequency	of	feelings	as	measured	in	the	survey	items.	
However,	in	applied	work	on	similar	concepts,	‘[t]here	is...	tentative	evidence	that	asking	respondents	
to	recall	the	frequency	of	their	emotional	experiences	may	produce	more	accurate	reports	than	
intensity	judgements’,	OECD	2013,	75.	There	is	no	obvious	reason	to	expect	self-respect	to	differ	in	this	
regard.	
35	 Diener,	Suh,	Lucas	and	Smith	1999;	Schimmack	and	Diener	2003.	
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Our	analysis	begins	with	two	measures	of	unemployment	risk.	Our	first	measure	is	the	
subjective	probability	 individuals	ascribe	to	 losing	their	 job	and	becoming	unemployed	
in	the	next	twelve	months.	Respondents	are	asked	to	identify	their	risk	on	a	scale	from	0	
to	 100	where	 zero	 indicates	 that	 the	 change	will	 definitely	 not	 occur,	 and	 100	 that	 it	
definitely	will.	This	subjective	measure	captures	the	theoretical	concept	of	interest,	since	
individuals	typically	need	to	be	aware	of	the	relevant	risks	they	are	facing	for	these	risks	
to	affect	self-respect.36		However,	in	empirical	terms	we	might	be	concerned	about	using	
subjective	risk	perception	to	identify	the	links	between	risk	and	self-respect,	since	in	this	
formulation	 we	 are	 simply	 correlating	 attitudes	 with	 other	 attitudes.	 In	 this	 type	 of	
relationship	 it	 is	 very	 difficult	 to	 be	 confident	 that	 any	 relationship	 runs	 in	 the	 causal	
direction	 that	 we	 have	 in	 mind.	 It	 might	 be	 that	 low	 self-respect	 leads	 to	 more	
pessimistic	 assessments	 of	 unemployment	 risk.	 Alternatively,	 some	 other	 kind	 of	
attitude	 –	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 risk	 aversion,	 for	 example	 –	 might	 shape	 both	 risk	
perceptions	 and	 self-respect.	 To	 guard	 against	 this	 possibility	we	 therefore	 also	 use	 a	
measure	of	unemployment	risk	that	is	derived	from	the	objective	economic	position	of	
the	respondent.	We	know	the	gender	and	occupation	of	each	of	our	respondents	in	the	
HSE,	 and	 can	 match	 that	 data	 to	 Office	 for	 National	 Statistics	 measures	 of	 the	
unemployment	 rates	 faced	 within	 those	 gender-occupation	 groups	 in	 the	 population.	
We	use	this	gender-occupation	unemployment	rate	as	an	objective	measure	of	the	risk	
of	unemployment.	In	applying	this	objective	measure	we	are	not	assuming	that	there	is	
																																								 																				
36	 It	is	possible	for	a	risk	that	is	unrecognized	by	me	to	impact	on	my	self-respect	if	others	are	aware	of	
my	insecure	position	and,	as	a	result,	treat	me	in	ways	that	affect	my	self-respect.	However,	such	cases	
will	be	rarer.	
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some	 mechanism	 by	 which	 objective	 risk	 can	 impact	 self-respect	 without	 running	
through	subjective	risk.	Rather	we	are	measuring	the	component	of	subjective	risk	that	
is	accounted	for	by	the	objective	reality	of	an	individual’s	employment	situation.	
The	results	below	come	from	statistical	models	that	include	controls	for	income,	gender,	
age	and	its	quadratic,	as	well	as	indicator	variables	for	self-employed	respondents.	Thus	
we	are	able	to	isolate	insecurity	from	other	material	and	social	bases	of	respect.	Figures	
1	and	2	plot	the	expected	probabilities	of	a	typical	respondent	enjoying	self-respect,	as	
risk	changes.37	For	both	subjective	and	objective	unemployment	 risk,	 there	 is	a	 strong	
negative	relationship:	as	risk	increases,	the	likelihood	of	enjoying	self-respect	declines.38	
Whilst	our	primary	agenda	is	philosophical,	these	results	also	resonate	with	recent	work	
in	political	economy.	Specifically,	 the	finding	that	economic	risk	 is	negatively	related	to	
self-respect	 is	 readily	 comprehensible	 in	 light	 of	 the	 known	 political	 consequences	 of	
risk:	those	faced	with	increasing	risk	tend	to	demand	more	of	the	very	social	insurance	
programmes	that	Tomasi	criticises.39	
[[	Figure	1	about	here	]]	
																																								 																				
37	 The	‘typical’	respondent	is	constructed	by	holding	the	control	variables	constant	as	risk	changes.	We	
hold	income	and	age	at	their	average	(mean)	values	in	the	data	used	for	the	model,	and	consider	a	
male	respondent,	not	self-employed.	
38		 As	a	reviewer	has	pointed	out	to	us,	there	is	a	question	about	how	we	best	interpret	Tomasi’s	claim	
that	risk	is	a	‘precondition’	of	self-respect.	Strictly,	this	might	be	understood	as	the	claim	that	we	need	
some	(non-zero)	degree	of	economic	risk	in	order	to	enjoy	self-respect.	Here	we	test	the	claim	that	
increased	risk	leads	to	a	greater	likelihood	of	an	individual	having	self-respect.	This	seems	to	us	a	more	
plausible	way	of	reading	Tomasi’s	‘precondition’	claim,	given	that	the	vast	majority	of	individuals	will	
experience	some	degree	of	economic	risk.	
39		 Hacker,	Rehm,	and	Schlesinger	2013;	Iversen	and	Soskice	2001.	
20	
Figure	 1.	 Expected	 probabilities	 of	 a	 typical	 respondent	 reporting	
having	 self-respect	 as	 self-reported	 chance	 of	 job	 loss	 increases.	
Shaded	areas	indicate	95%	confidence	intervals.		
[[	Figure	2	about	here	]]	
Figure	 2.	 Expected	 probabilities	 of	 a	 typical	 respondent	 reporting	
having	 self-respect	as	occupation-gender	 specific	unemployment	 risks	
increase.	Shaded	areas	indicate	95%	confidence	intervals.	
Our	 third	measure	 of	 economic	 risk	 draws	 on	 a	 large	 recent	 literature	 in	 the	 political	
economy	of	skills,	which	highlights	that	 investing	 in	skills	 that	are	specific	 to	particular	
jobs,	firms,	or	industries	exposes	the	worker	to	greater	risk	than	a	similar	investment	in	
more	general	skills.	If	skills	are	specific	to	a	particular	industry	or	firm,	then	workers	face	
the	risk	of	 income	loss	 if	that	 industry	goes	into	decline:	the	premium	paid	for	specific	
skills	 is	 (by	 construction)	 not	 available	 outside	 the	 particular	 industry.	 Compared	 to	 a	
worker	at	 the	 same	 level	of	pay,	but	whose	 skills	 are	general,	 the	 specific	 skill	worker	
faces	higher	levels	of	risk.40	Specific	skills	–	and	the	associated	risk	of	income	loss	–	are	
measured	with	reference	to	the	specialisation	of	skills	within	occupations.	The	measure	
is	based	on	the	International	Labour	Organisation	classification	of	jobs	into	occupations	
in	 the	 International	 Standard	 Classification	 of	 Occupations	 (ISCO)	 coding	 scheme.	 The	
scheme	 uses	 the	 level	 and	 specialisation	 of	 skills	 involved	 in	 different	 occupations	 to	
group	 them	 into	 categories	 at	 varying	 levels	 of	 similarity.	 The	 smallest	 occupational	
																																								 																				
40	 Iversen	and	Soskice	2001.	
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groupings	consist	of	390	classes	or	‘unit	groups’,	each	with	a	high	level	of	homogeneity	
in	 terms	 of	 their	 required	 type	 of	 knowledge,	 tools	 and	 equipment,	 the	 materials	
worked	on,	or	with,	and	the	goods	and	services	that	are	produced.	These	unit	groups	are	
aggregated	 into	broader	 categories,	 up	 to	nine	major	 groups	 at	 the	highest	 level.	 The	
specificity	of	skills	within	any	higher	level	group	can	then	be	measured	by	the	number	of	
different	unit	groups	of	which	it	is	comprised.41	
Considering	skill	specificity	helps	to	solve	two	(related)	problems	in	determining	the	link	
between	 risk	 and	 self-respect.	 First,	 it	 makes	 the	 possibility	 of	 reverse	 causation	 less	
plausible:	 Low	 self-respect	 might	 lead	 to	 higher	 perceived	 unemployment	 risk	 and	
perhaps	 even	 to	 a	 greater	 likelihood	 of	 entering	 objectively	 less	 secure	 occupations;	
taking	on	the	risk	associated	with	investment	in	specific	skills	is	not	so	easily	thought	of	
as	a	consequence	of	low	self-respect.		Secondly,	the	specific-skill	measure	eliminates	the	
link	between	risk	and	general	disadvantage.	For	example,	the	lowest	levels	of	specificity	
are	found	in	sales	and	customer	service,	and	administrative	and	secretarial	occupations;	
the	 highest	 in	 skilled	 and	 –	 particularly—semi-skilled	 trades.	 These	 occupations	 have	
similar,	intermediate,	levels	of	pay	and	status,	yet	have	very	different	risk	profiles	based	
on	skill	specificity.	
[[Figure	3	about	here]]	
																																								 																				
41	 The	measure	is	actually	the	number	of	unit	groups	relative	to	the	size	of	the	population	employed	in	
the	higher-level	groups.	A	full	explanation	of	the	measure	can	be	found	at:	
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/SkillSpecificity.htm#Explanation	
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Figure	3.	Expected	probabilities	of	a	typical	respondent	reporting	
having	 self-respect	 as	 the	 risk	 associated	 with	 specific	 skills	
changes.	Shaded	areas	indicate	95%	confidence	intervals.		
Figure	 3	 shows	 that	 the	 negative	 relationship	 between	 risk	 and	 self-respect	 is	 still	
apparent	 when	 considering	 skill-based	 risks.	 The	 detrimental	 impact	 is	 smaller,	 but	
higher	risks	are	still	(statistically	significantly)	associated	with	lower	self-respect.42	
B.	CAUSAL	INFERENCE	
Interpreting	 the	 relationships	 in	 the	 cross-sectional	 data	 as	 causal	 is	 valid	 only	 if,	
conditional	on	 the	 included	covariates,	 those	experiencing	high	 levels	of	 risk	are	good	
counterfactual	 observations	 for	 those	 at	 low	 levels	 of	 risk.	 Whilst	 there	 are	 strong	
theoretical	 reasons	 to	 assume	 a	 causal	 relationship	 from	 risk	 to	 self-respect	 in	 the	
associations	 we	 report,	 we	 can	 never	 fully	 defend	 against	 problems	 of	 endogeneity	
when	comparing	across	individuals.43		
Panel	data	allow	us	to	solve	this	problem	by	considering	only	variation	in	risk-exposure	
and	self-respect	over	time	within	the	same	 individuals.	 In	the	appendix	we	present	an	
																																								 																				
42	 In	fact,	this	figure	may	understate	the	negative	impact	of	skill-based	risk	on	self-respect.	The	model	
used	to	generate	this	figure	does	not	include	controls	for	occupation,	because	the	skill	specificity	
variable	itself	is	defined	at	the	occupational	level.	But	there	are	good	reasons	to	think	that	the	kinds	of	
occupations	that	require	highly	specific	skills,	or	the	individuals	who	undertake	those	occupations,	may	
have	other	characteristics	that	promote	self-respect.	For	example,	this	kind	of	investment	in	skills	for	
the	long	run	implies	a	commitment	to	a	particular	life	plan.	In	the	analyses,	the	risk	measure	will	also	
pick	up	the	(offsetting)	effects	that	this	dynamic	has	on	self-respect.	
43	See	the	appendix	for	an	extended	discussion	of	the	arguments	for	and	against	reverse	causation	and	
spurious	association	in	the	cross-sectional	data.		
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analysis	 of	 the	British	Household	Panel	 Survey	 (BHPS)44,	which	 shows	how	changes	 in	
risk-exposure	 relate	 to	 over-time	 changes	 in	 self-respect.	 Consistent	 with	 our	 cross-
sectional	 results,	 we	 find	 that	 higher	 risk	 (operationalised	 using	 objective	
unemployment	 risk)	 is	 associated	 with	 lower	 levels	 of	 self-respect.	 That	 is,	 when	
individuals	are	experiencing	periods	of	relatively	high	unemployment	risk,	they	are	less	
likely	 to	 report	 self-respect.	 Thus	 the	 panel	 data	 analysis	 bolsters	 the	 case	 for	 a	
(negative)	causal	relationship	between	risk-exposure	and	self-respect.45	
C.	NON-LINEAR	EFFECTS	OF	RISK	
The	 specification	 of	 the	 models	 in	 the	 main	 analyses	 assumes	 a	 linear	 relationship	
between	risk	and	self-respect.46	That	is,	any	increment	of	risk	is	modelled	as	having	the	
same	(it	turns	out	negative)	effect	on	self-respect.	But	perhaps	this	linear	picture	is	not	
the	 most	 realistic	 representation	 of	 how	 risk	 is	 experienced,	 or	 indeed	 a	 good	
representation	 of	 Tomasi’s	 claim	 that	 risk	 is	 a	 ‘precondition’	 of	 self-respect.47	 A	more	
																																								 																				
44	University	of	Essex	Institute	for	Social	and	Economic	Research	2010	
45	Given	the	superiority	of	panel	data	for	causal	inference,	a	few	words	on	why	we	nevertheless	focus	on	
the	cross-sectional	data	are	in	order.	First,	the	measure	of	the	self-respect	outcome	available	in	the	
BHPS	is	inferior	to	that	in	the	HSE.	Secondly,	there	is	no	available	measure	of	subjective	unemployment	
risk,	which	is	our	preferred	measure	of	risk.	Finally,	the	incidental	parameters	problem	associated	with	
estimating	within-individual	effects	with	a	binary	outcome	means	that	the	substantive	effect	sizes	in	
the	panel	data	are	much	less	intuitive:	we	cannot	generate	and	compare	predicted	probabilities	under	
differing	levels	of	risk	in	a	straightforward	way.		
46		 Technically	the	models	are	linear	between	risk	and	the	linear	predictor	of	self-respect	which	is	then	
transformed	via	the	logistic	specification	into	a	value	between	zero	and	one.	In	what	follows	we	are	
interested	in	the	shape	of	this	underlying	function	relating	risk	to	the	linear	predictor.	
47		 We	thank	two	anonymous	reviewers	for	pressing	us	to	consider	a	non-linear	relationship	between	risk	
and	self-respect.	
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conservative	interpretation	might	imply	an	inverted-U	shape,	such	that	low	levels	of	risk	
increase	 self-respect,	 but	 the	 relationship	 reverses	 after	 a	 certain	 point.	 The	 intuition	
here	is	that	relatively	small	amounts	of	risk	might	be	motivating	or	empowering,	even	if	
risk	beyond	a	certain	level	tends	to	become	threatening	or	overwhelming.	
We	can	address	 this	question	empirically	 in	 the	HSE	data,	 through	 the	specification	of	
different	 functional	 forms.	We	do	 find	 some	non-linearity,	but	 there	 is	no	evidence	of	
the	inverted-U,	which	would	imply	a	benefit	to	risk	at	low	levels.	Specifically,	considering	
each	 0.1	 increment	 of	 (self-reported)	 risk	 as	 a	 separate	 category	 indicates	 that	 the	
negative	effects	in	the	linear	model	are	driven	by	people	reporting	chances	of	job	loss	at	
or	above	0.3.	The	effect	on	self-respect	of	subjective	risk	below	this	 level	seems	to	be	
essentially	 zero.	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 this	 is	 good	 news	 for	 risk.	 At	 low	 levels	 it	 has	 no	
negative	effect	and	this	area	of	the	subjective	risk	scale	is	where	most	people	rate	their	
exposure:	57%	of	respondents	are	in	the	lowest	three	categories	(0,	0.1,	0.2).	However,	
there	 is	 no	 level	 of	 risk	 at	which	 risk	benefits	 self-respect	 and	 43%	 of	 people	 remain	
exposed	to	levels	of	risk	which	appear	to	be	harmful	to	self-respect.	Further	details,	and	
analysis	of	non-linearity	with	the	objective	risk	measures,	can	be	found	in	the	appendix.	
Linear	specifications	also	imply	that	the	effect	of	risk	is	the	same	for	everyone,	when	we	
might	 expect	 that	 different	 circumstances	 will	 lead	 to	 varying	 effects	 of	 any	 given	
increment	 of	 risk.	 In	 particular,	 some	 people	 may	 be	 better	 able	 to	 cope	 with	 risk	
because	of	 their	capacity	 to	draw	on	other	 resources.	Two	examples	of	such	buffering	
resources,	 for	which	we	have	empirical	measures,	 are	 income	and	 the	presence	of	an	
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adult	 partner	 in	 the	 household.	 Both	 of	 these	 factors	 might	 lessen	 the	 impact	 of	
employment	 insecurity	 on	 self-respect	 by	 increasing	 the	 likelihood	 that	 the	 individual	
has	a	material	cushion	to	fall	back	on.	It	also	seems	plausible	that	having	a	partner	might	
directly	mitigate	 the	psychological	effects	of	 the	 threat	of	economic	 loss.	 	However,	 in	
our	data	we	 find	no	evidence	of	 this	 kind	of	differential	 impact	 (in	models	 interacting	
subjective	 risk	 with	 income,	 or	 with	 a	 simplified	 version	 of	 marital	 status	 which	
separates	those	who	are	married	or	cohabiting	from	the	single,	separated	and	divorced).	
The	shape	of	the	relationship	between	risk	and	self-respect	is	further	complicated	by	the	
distinction	between	absolute	and	relative	risk.	For	example,	 imagine	a	society	in	which	
everybody	 faces	 a	 high	 risk	 of	 bad	 economic	 outcomes.	 Should	 we	 expect	 the	
consequences	for	self-respect	to	be	the	same	as	for	a	high-risk	subgroup	in	an	otherwise	
economically	more	secure	society?48	Relatedly,	does	the	impact	of	economic	risk	on	self-
concept	 stem	 primarily	 from	 the	 dynamics	 of	 power	 and	 control	 that	 typically	
accompany	 real-world	 risky	 situations?	Or	 is	 self-respect	 also	 threatened	by	economic	
uncertainty	 itself	–	uncertainty	effects	 that	 remain	present	 in	contexts	of	equal	 risk?49	
We	are	unable	to	tackle	these	questions	in	a	systematic	way	using	our	quantitative	data,	
since	our	methodology	relies	on	the	existence	of	inequalities	in	economic	risk	in	order	to	
estimate	the	impact	of	absolute	risk	levels.	In	other	words,	our	results	tell	us	about	the	
																																								 																				
48	 We	thank	Adam	Swift	for	raising	the	distinction	between	absolute	and	relative	risk.	
49		 The	example	of	the	insecure	tenant,	with	which	we	began	the	paper,	involves	vulnerability	to	the	
power	of	a	landlord	as	well	as	uncertainty	about	the	future.	The	relationship	between	economic	
insecurity	and	domination	is	widely	discussed	in	the	republican	literature.	See,	for	example,	Pettit	
2007.	
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impact	of	differing	levels	of	economic	risk	in	a	context	of	unequal	risk.	However,	we	can	
draw	some	tentative	hypotheses	based	on	the	mechanisms	linking	risk	and	self-respect	
outlined	 in	 section	 I.	 Specifically,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 social	 meaning	 of	 risk	 will	 differ	
according	 to	whether	 risk	 is	 something	 that	affects	everybody,	or	only	a	 subset	of	 the	
population.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 seems	 plausible	 to	 us	 that	 the	 psychological	 and	
behavioural	connections	between	risk	and	self-respect	are	at	least	partly	independent	of	
the	distributive	question.	
D.	RISK	OR	OVERCOMING	ADVERSITY?	
In	this	section	we	consider	an	alternative,	and	potentially	more	generous,	interpretation	
of	Tomasi’s	claim	that	risk	is	a	precondition	of	self-respect.	In	particular,	we	might	think	
that	risk	benefits	self-respect	in	the	sense	that	leaving	individuals	to	face	risk	also	allows	
them	to	experience	the	self-respect	benefits	of	triumphing	over	adversity.	Understood	in	
this	way,	 Tomasi’s	 claim	 is	 less	 about	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 risk	 itself	 and	
more	 about	 the	 sense	 of	 resilience	 or	 confidence	 that	 stems	 from	 having	 faced	
unfavourable	outcomes	in	the	past	and	overcome	them.50	
Using	 the	 BHPS,	 we	 investigate	 whether	 having	 experienced	 economic	 adversity,	 but	
come	out	of	 it	well,	 increases	self-respect.	First,	each	survey	period	 is	categorised	as	a	
good	 or	 bad	 outcome	 state	 in	 terms	 of	 labour	 market	 position.	 Periods	 where	
																																								 																				
50		 We	thank	two	anonymous	reviewers	for	drawing	our	attention	to	this	alternative	interpretation	of	
Tomasi.	To	evaluate	this	argument	more	fully	we	would	also	need	to	consider	the	effects	on	the	self-
respect	of	those	who	do	not	bounce	back.	But	here	we	focus	on	whether	there	are	self-respect	
benefits	for	those	who	do	succeed	in	overcoming	adversity.	
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respondents	 are	 unemployed,	 long-term	 sick,	 disabled,	 or	 on	 a	 government	 training	
scheme	are	classed	as	bad	outcomes.	Employment	and	self-employment	are	coded	as	
good	outcomes,	whilst	periods	of	maternity,	retirement	and	family	care,	as	well	as	being	
a	 student,	are	omitted	 from	the	analysis	by	virtue	of	 their	ambiguity.	At	each	point	 in	
time,	we	 code	whether	each	 respondent	has	 successfully	 come	out	of	 a	previous	bad	
outcome:	if	they	have	both	a	bad	period	(as	described	above),	and	a	subsequent	period	
in	 employment	 or	 self-employment.	 We	 find	 no	 evidence	 that	 having	 successfully	
resolved	an	adverse	labour	market	situation	in	the	past	improves	self-respect.	Moreover,	
the	 ‘instantaneous’	 effect	 of	 being	 in	 the	 bad	 state	 has	 consistently	 negative	 effects.	
Thus	we	 find	no	 support	even	 for	 the	 looser,	more	 intuitive	 interpretation	of	Tomasi’s	
argument	 as	 concerned	 with	 the	 self-respect	 benefits	 of	 overcoming	 hardship.	 Our	
results	 here	 resonate	 with	 research	 showing	 that	 past	 unemployment	 has	 long-term	
negative	consequences	for	individual	happiness	and	mental	health.51	
E.	THE	BENEFITS	OF	CULTIVATED	RISK-TAKING	
The	best	available	evidence	suggests	that	economic	risk	has	a	negative	 impact	on	self-
respect.	However,	Tomasi’s	claim	that	 risk	underpins	self-respect	 is	not	wholly	without	
empirical	 support.	 In	 particular,	 there	 is	 qualitative	 evidence	 showing	 that	 the	
experience	 of	 risk	 can	 have	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 individual	 self-concept.	 For	 example,	
Lupton	and	Tulloch	conducted	a	series	of	in-depth	interviews	with	Australian	and	British	
participants	about	how	they	understand	risk	and	how	it	shapes	their	 lives.	Participants	
																																								 																				
51		 Winkelmann	and	Winkelmann	1998;	Daly	and	Delaney	2013.	
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described	important	benefits	of	risky	experiences.	Moreover,	some	of	the	ways	in	which	
they	 characterized	 the	 value	 of	 risk	 resonate	with	 Rawlsian	 self-respect.	 For	 example,	
some	participants	appealed	directly	to	the	related	notion	of	self-esteem.	Others	talked	
about	 self-improvement,	 an	 increased	 sense	 of	 control	 and	 a	 sense	 of	 agency.	 In	
summary,	 ‘Cultivated	 risk-taking	…	 is	 seen	 to	provide	an	opportunity	 for	 individuals	 to	
display	courage,	to	master	fear,	to	provide	something	to	themselves	which	allows	them	
to	live	life	with	a	sense	of	personal	agency’.52	Lupton	and	Tulloch’s	study	coheres	with	a	
broader	 tradition	 of	 qualitative	 research	 that	 reports	 individual-level	 benefits	 of	 risky	
experiences.	For	example,	in	his	widely	cited	account	of	‘edgework’,	Lyng	emphasizes	the	
sense	 of	 self-actualization,	 self-determination	 and	 confidence	 derived	 through	 the	
confrontation	 of	 risk.53	 Similar	 themes	 have	 emerged	 from	 studies	 of	 risk-taking	 in	
criminology.	 For	 example,	 in	 his	 classic	 Seductions	 of	 Crime,	 Katz	 describes	 how	
‘hardmen’	robbers	gain	a	sense	of	agency	and	control	by	creating	order	within	high-risk	
situations:	 ‘chaotic	 situations	…	are	 transformed	 into	courses	of	action	 that	make	self-
respecting	sense	through	the	imposition	of	the	form	and	discipline	of	a	stickup’.54	
Thus	there	is	evidence	from	a	number	of	disciplines	and	domains	that	supports	the	claim	
that	 the	 experience	 of	 risk	 can	 promote	 positive	 self-attitudes.	 But	what,	 if	 anything,	
does	this	research	say	to	Tomasi’s	claim	about	the	value	of	exposure	to	economic	risks?	
The	reference	to	‘cultivated	risk-taking’	in	the	passage	from	Lupton	and	Tulloch	is	crucial.	
																																								 																				
52		 Tulloch	and	Lupton	2003.	
53	 Lyng	1990,	860	and	863.	
54	 Katz	1988,	225.	
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Their	interviews	covered	a	range	of	experiences,	including	speaking	out	on	controversial	
subjects	and	deciding	to	migrate,	as	well	as	risky	sports	and	leisure	activities.	However,	
these	 diverse	 activities	 had	 a	 key	 feature	 in	 common:	 each	 involved	 the	 individual	
making	 a	 deliberate	 and	 voluntary	 decision	 to	 expose	 herself	 to	 risk.	 Similarly,	 Lyng	
introduces	the	notion	of	edgework	to	capture	a	form	of	high-stakes	voluntary	risk-taking.	
In	 contrast	 to	 these	 accounts,	 Tomasi	 appeals	 to	 self-respect	 to	 make	 a	 case	 for	
widespread	exposure	 to	 involuntary	 risk	 in	 the	economic	 sphere.	On	Tomasi’s	 account	
the	experience	of	 risk	 is	 not	 something	 to	be	 sought	out	by	 a	minority	of	 individuals;	
rather	 ‘Risk	 is	 to	 become	 a	 daily	 necessity	 shouldered	 by	 the	 masses’.55	 Importantly,	
providing	people	with	a	baseline	of	security	is	often	the	best	way	of	enabling	voluntary	
risk-taking	 (and	 its	 self-respect	 benefits).	 Thus	 if	 our	 goal	 is	 to	 increase	 self-respect	
enhancing	 risk-taking	 (rather	 than	 simply	 to	 put	 people	 at	 economic	 risk),	 social	
democratic	 regimes	are	 likely	 to	outperform	models	closer	 to	Tomasi’s	 ideal	of	market	
democracy.56	
We	 conclude	 that	 the	 view	 of	 risk	 underlying	 Tomasi’s	 account	 has	 some	 empirical	
weight,	 but	 not	 in	 the	 context	 to	 which	 Tomasi	 applies	 it.	 However,	 research	 into	
cultivated	 risk-taking	might	offer	a	way	of	partially	 rehabilitating	Tomasi’s	argument:	 if	
some	people	are	more	 inclined	towards	risk-taking	than	others,	perhaps	for	these	risk-
loving	 individuals	the	experience	of	economic	risk	 is	an	 important	precondition	of	self-
																																								 																				
55	 Sennett	1998,	80.	
56		 On	the	importance	of	security	as	a	precondition	for	risk-taking,	see	Hacker	2008.	For	empirical	
evidence	linking	greater	social	spending	to	risk-taking,	see	Bird	2001,	357-83.	
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respect?	For	Rawls,	 the	social	bases	of	self-respect	concern	those	conditions	 ‘normally	
essential’	 for	 a	 lively	 sense	 of	 self-worth	 and	 confidence.57	 But	 perhaps	 there	 are	
significant	limits	to	our	ability	to	generalize	about	the	relationship	between	risk	and	self-
respect?	The	HSE	data	support	the	first	step	in	this	argument:	individuals	do	differ	in	the	
extent	to	which	they	report	enjoyment	of	risk-taking	and	there	is	a	positive	relationship	
between	enjoyment	of	risk-taking	and	self-respect.58	Crucially,	however,	the	enjoyment	
of	risk-taking	does	not	mediate	the	relationship	between	economic	 insecurity	and	self-
respect.	 In	 other	 words,	 economic	 insecurity	 has	 a	 similarly	 negative	 impact	 on	 self-
respect	even	for	those	individuals	who	express	more	favourable	attitudes	towards	risk-
taking.		This	feature	of	the	data	is	shown	in	Figure	4,	which	displays	the	expected	levels	
of	 self-respect	 as	 subjective	 unemployment	 risks	 increase	 (as	 in	 Figure	 1),	 but	
differentiates	the	expectation	depending	on	the	individual’s	attitude	towards	risk.59		
	 	 [[	Figure	4	about	here	]]	
Figure	4:	Expected	probabilities	of	a	typical	respondent	reporting	
having	self-respect	as	subjective	unemployment	risk	changes.	The	
																																								 																				
57	 Rawls	2001,	59.	Emphasis	added.	
58	 There	is	a	large	amount	of	research	into	variation	in	attitudes	towards	risk	and	propensity	for	risk-
taking.	For	a	classic	account	in	the	‘personality	types’	tradition,	see	Balint	1987,	Chapter	2.	On	
demographic	factors,	see	Finucane	et	al.	2000,	159-72.	For	an	account	that	emphasizes	socioeconomic	
position,	see	Lyng	1990,	876-77	and	882-3.	
59	 The	expected	values	come	from	a	regression	model	equivalent	to	those	in	Section	II.A,	but	with	an	
added	term,	the	interaction	of	risk-orientation	and	subjective	unemployment	risk,	which	allows	the	
effect	of	unemployment	risk	to	vary	according	to	risk	preference.	Risk	attitudes	are	measured	via	the	
level	of	agreement	with	the	statement	‘I	get	a	lot	of	pleasure	out	of	taking	risks’,	with	7	possible	
responses	ranging	from	‘Disagree	strongly’	to	‘agree	strongly’.	The	two	categories	used	to	create	Figure	
4	represent	the	interquartile	range	of	responses	to	this	question.	
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solid	line	shows	the	probabilities	for	those	who	enjoy	taking	risks,	
the	 dashed	 line	 those	 who	 do	 not.	 Shaded	 areas	 indicate	 95%	
confidence	intervals.		
III.	CHARACTERISTICS	OF	RISKY	EXPERIENCES	
We	have	 reported	a	divergent	 set	of	 findings	about	 the	 relationship	between	 risk	and	
self-respect.	In	the	economic	sphere,	both	the	existing	evidence	about	job	insecurity	and	
our	own	analyses	of	the	HSE	and	BHPS	suggest	that	risk	is	damaging	to	self-respect.	On	
the	 other	 hand,	 there	 is	 an	 established	 body	 of	 qualitative	 research	 showing	 that	
individuals	 who	 participate	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 forms	 of	 risk-taking	 find	 this	 activity	 to	 be	
beneficial	 to	 their	 sense	 of	 worth	 and	 confidence.	 As	 discussed	 above,	 the	 extent	 to	
which	risks	are	voluntarily	confronted	is	perhaps	the	most	obvious	feature	that	accounts	
for	 this	pattern	of	 results.60	 The	 significance	of	 voluntariness	 is	 reinforced	by	 research	
showing	 that	 the	benefits	of	 risk	 are	often	experienced	at	 the	moment	of	deciding	 to	
risk,	rather	than	through	the	ongoing	experience	of	insecurity.61	Part	of	what	is	valuable	
to	 us	 about	 experiencing	 certain	 forms	 of	 risk	 is	 the	 opportunity	 to	 see	 ourselves	 as	
people	 who	 are	 willing	 to	 confront	 and	 to	 choose	 risk,	 and	 this	 value	 is	 lacking	 in	
contexts	of	imposed	risk.	
The	more	general	 thought	here	 is	 that	risky	situations	differ	along	a	number	of	crucial	
dimensions	 that	 affect	 how	 risk	 is	 experienced,	 including	 the	 relationship	 with	 self-
																																								 																				
60	 	But	for	doubts	about	the	importance	of	voluntariness	as	a	factor	shaping	public	assessments	of	the	
acceptability	of	risk,	see	Slovic,	146-48.	
61	 See	Sennett	1998,	87.	
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respect.	 Risk	 itself	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 delivering	 the	 self-respect	 benefits	
highlighted	in	the	literature	on	cultivated	risk-taking:	It	is	in	part	the	fact	of	not	knowing	
what	 the	 future	 will	 look	 like	 (and	 sometimes	 the	 sense	 of	 danger	 this	 brings)	 that	
activates	 people’s	 sense	 of	 agency.	 However,	 the	 self-respect	 benefits	 of	 risk	 are	
conditional	on	some	key	features	of	the	context.	In	addition	to	voluntariness,	we	should	
consider	 the	 extent	 to	which	 risk	 permeates	 everyday	 life	 or	 is	 contraposed	with	 the	
everyday.62	 On	 this	 dimension	 of	 pervasiveness,	 economic	 insecurity	 again	 looks	 very	
different	from	the	forms	of	risk	that	qualitative	research	has	identified	as	beneficial.	For	
example,	 for	 the	 skydivers	 in	 Lyng’s	 study,	 a	 sense	 of	 contrast	 with	 the	 everyday	
constituted	an	 important	part	of	 the	value	of	 risk.63	Thirdly,	 risks	vary	 in	 the	extent	 to	
which	 they	 are	 experienced	 as	 controllable	 or	 as	 determined	 by	 forces	 beyond	 the	
individual’s	 control.	 For	 example,	 think	 about	 playing	 the	 lottery	 compared	 to	
mountaineering	(for	the	experienced	climber!);	they	involve	very	different	forms	of	risk	
in	 this	 regard.	The	extent	 to	which	 the	benefits	of	 risk	stem	from	the	sense	of	control	
also	emerges	strongly	in	Lyng’s	research.	In	addition	to	the	specific	skills	involved	in	the	
activity	of	skydiving,	his	‘edgeworkers’	valued	the	exercise	of	the	generalized	capacity	to	
maintain	control	in	the	face	of	potential	disaster.64	Moreover,	they	commonly	eschewed	
risks	that	they	perceived	as	pure	gambles:	‘What	they	seek	is	the	chance	to	exercise	skill	
																																								 																				
62	 Cf.	Giddens	1991,	132.	Giddens	runs	these	two	dimensions	of	voluntariness	and	pervasiveness	
together.	
63	 Lyng	1990,	861	and	880-81.	
64	 Lyng	1990,	859-60	and	871.	
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in	negotiating	a	challenge	rather	than	turn	their	fate	over	to	the	roll	of	the	dice’.65	The	
broader	message	 is	 that	 the	experience	of	 risk	 is	more	 likely	 to	 increase	our	 sense	of	
worth	or	confidence	to	the	extent	that	we	perceive	the	situation	to	offer	us	some	degree	
of	control	and	the	opportunity	to	exercise	our	skills.		
We	are	 concerned	here	with	perceptions	 of	 control,	 and	 the	distinction	between	 risks	
felt	 to	 be	 controllable	 and	 those	 experienced	 as	 determined	 by	 outside	 forces	 is	 not	
clearcut	 or	 completely	 stable:	 studies	 suggest	 that	 we	 sometimes	 attribute	 control	 in	
activities	that	are,	 from	an	objective	perspective,	clearly	pure	gambles.66	Nevertheless,	
the	distinction	between	gambles	 and	 skilled	 leisure	pursuits	 provides	 a	useful	 starting	
point	for	thinking	about	divergent	experiences	of	risk.	But	what	does	this	imply	for	the	
domain	of	economic	risk?	For	most	of	us,	the	experience	of	economic	life	probably	lies	
somewhere	between	these	two	poles	 in	respect	of	the	degree	of	 felt	control.	Thinking	
about	 the	 economic	 domain	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 spectrum	 of	 perceived	 control	 can	 help	 to	
account	for	an	as-yet	unaddressed	complication	in	Lupton	and	Tulloch’s	findings.	Whilst	
we	 have	 emphasized	 the	 contrast	 between	 cultivated	 risk	 and	 economic	 risk,	 a	 small	
subset	 of	 participants	 in	 this	 study	 drew	 parallels	 between	 risk	 in	 their	 leisure	 and	
economic	 lives,	 and	 described	 the	 latter	 as	 similarly	 enjoyable	 and	 empowering.67	
Underlying	the	more	positive	experience	of	economic	risk	amongst	this	subgroup	of	hi-
																																								 																				
65	 Lyng	1990,	863.	
66	 For	a	classic	account,	see	Langer	1975.	Relatedly,	Lyng	notes	that	when	accidents	occur,	skydivers	do	
not	conclude	that	the	dead	or	injured	were	unlucky.	Rather,	this	is	taken	as	evidence	that	they	lacked	
the	necessary	survival	skills	–	see	Lyng	1990,	874.	
67	 Tulloch	and	Lupton	2003,	75	and	78.	
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tech	workers	was	a	strong	sense	of	control,	driven	by	the	belief	that	their	skills	enable	
them	 to	 negotiate	 increasingly	 challenging	 labour	 markets.	 This	 contrasts	 with	 the	
experiences	 of	 a	 group	 of	 car	 workers,	 who	 reported	 a	 lack	 of	 control	 in	 the	 face	 of	
decision-making	 by	 large	 corporations.	 Further	 research	would	 help	 to	 build	 on	 these	
findings.	 For	 example,	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 factors	 typically	
associated	 with	 skill	 situations,	 such	 as	 planning	 and	 organization,	 increases	 the	
perception	of	 control	 in	 contexts	where	outcomes	 are,	 in	 fact,	 determined	by	outside	
forces.68	 Are	 these	 features	 particularly	 strongly	 present	 for	 those	 who	 experience	
economic	risk	in	more	positive	terms?	
A	fourth	important	way	in	which	risky	situations	differ	concerns	the	nature	of	the	stakes.	
However,	here	the	implications	for	self-respect	are	less	clear.	We	might	assume	that	risk	
is	more	 likely	 to	 threaten	 self-respect	when	 the	 potential	 losses	 are	 severe.	 However,	
some	of	the	classic	examples	of	cultivated	risk-taking,	through	which	participants	report	
gains	 to	 self-respect,	 involve	 the	very	highest	 stakes:	physical	health	or	even	 life	 itself.	
We	do	not	have	the	empirical	evidence	necessary	to	test	this	issue	directly.	However,	it	
seems	 likely	to	us	that	the	 impact	of	 the	size	of	 the	stakes	will	be	that	of	a	multiplier:	
where	 the	 other	 dimensions	 of	 risky	 contexts	 (voluntariness,	 non-pervasiveness	 and	
sense	of	 control)	 lead	 to	a	positive	experience	of	 risk,	 higher	 stakes	will	 reinforce	 this	
benefit;	but	a	negative	experience	of	risk	will	be	exacerbated	by	high	stakes.	
																																								 																				
68	 Lyng	1990,	875-76.	
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Further	 work	 is	 needed	 to	 build	 on	 this	 picture	 of	 the	 key	 dimensions	 of	 risky	
experiences.	For	example,	our	quantitative	estimates	cannot	capture	ways	in	which	the	
social	 and	 psychological	 meaning	 of	 risk	 may	 vary	 across	 individuals,	 or	 over	 time.		
However,	the	available	evidence	supports	the	following	hypotheses:	first,	the	experience	
of	 risk	 enhances	 individual	 self-respect	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 risks	 are	 experienced	 as	
voluntary,	non-pervasive	and	controllable;	secondly,	the	size	of	the	stakes	reinforces	the	
above	 relationships.	Although	our	empirical	analysis	 is	 restricted	 to	 three	measures	of	
economic	insecurity,	these	hypotheses	allow	us	to	offer	some	tentative	thoughts	about	
the	 relationship	between	 self-respect	 and	 further	 forms	of	 risk.	 For	example,	 consider	
insecurity	 in	 access	 to	 healthcare;	 a	 politically	 important	 aspect	 of	 risk	 that	 differs	
significantly	between	regimes.	Along	the	dimensions	of	voluntariness,	pervasiveness	and	
controllability,	 risk	 to	healthcare	 lies	much	closer	 to	 job	and	 income	 insecurity	 than	to	
the	 various	 examples	 of	 cultivated	 risk-taking.	 Thus	we	would	 expect	 the	 relationship	
between	 healthcare	 insecurity	 and	 self-respect	 to	 follow	 the	 negative	 pattern	
demonstrated	in	the	HSE	and	BHPS.69	
IV.	EMPIRICAL	POLITICAL	PHILOSOPHY	
We	have	seen	that	researchers	from	a	range	of	disciplines	are	increasingly	turning	their	
attention	 to	 questions	 about	 the	 nature	 and	 impact	 of	 economic	 insecurity.	 Thus	 it	 is	
perhaps	 surprising	 that	 Tomasi	 does	 not	 seek	 to	 ground	 his	 argument	 empirically.	
																																								 																				
69		 As	an	anonymous	reviewer	has	pointed	out,	economic	risk	itself	may	vary	in	ways	we	do	not	capture	
here.		For	example,	perhaps	risk	is	experienced	differently	in	our	roles	as	economic	producers	and	
consumers?	Given	the	data	available	to	us	(which	concerns	employment	and	income	risk),	we	cannot	
address	this	question	within	the	scope	of	the	paper.	
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However,	 Tomasi	 is	 not	 alone	 in	 allowing	 his	 claim	 about	 the	 preconditions	 of	 self-
respect	 to	 float	 free	 of	 empirical	 evidence.	 Much	 of	 the	 discourse	 around	 the	 social	
bases	of	self-respect	 in	political	philosophy	has	a	similar	character.	For	example,	 it	 is	a	
fundamental	 tenet	 of	 philosophical	 writing	 on	 self-respect,	 following	 Rawls,	 that	 self-
respect	 is	 strongly	 dependent	 on	 others’	 affirmation	 of	 our	 worth.	 But	 this	 claim	 is	
typically	 advanced	 without	 reference	 to	 psychological	 studies	 of	 the	 complex	
relationships	 between	our	 self-concept	 and	 how	others	 respond	 to	 and	 evaluate	 us.70	
This	 tendency	 is	 also	 evident	 in	 recent	 work	 on	 property-owning	 democracy,	 which	
involves	 some	 speculative	 claims	 about	 how	 the	 organization	 of	 the	 economy	 shapes	
individual	 self-respect.71	 What	 explains	 the	 disconnect	 between	 philosophical	 and	
empirical	work?	Do	we	simply	need	to	do	more	to	overcome	the	challenges	of	working	
across	 disciplinary	 boundaries?	 Or	 are	 there,	 in	 fact,	 good	 reasons	 for	 wanting	 to	
maintain	the	divide?	
Our	empirical	approach	to	the	question	of	the	relationship	between	risk	and	self-respect	
faces	 the	 following	 objection:	 we	 have	 investigated	 the	 economic	 conditions	 under	
which	people	actually	tend	to	derive	self-respect	in	the	here	and	now.	But	what	if	these	
responses	are	contaminated	by	the	effects	of	non-ideal	background	conditions,	or	are	in	
																																								 																				
70	 See,	for	example,	Gecas	and	Schwalbe	1983.	
71	 For	example,	Martin	O’Neill	asserts	that	“Only	by	making	sure	that	the	structure	of	the	economy	is	
such	as	to	broadly	disperse	control	over	productive	resources	…	can	we	ensure	that	all	citizens	are	able	
to	have	[self-respect].”	But	he	does	not	bring	forth	empirical	evidence	about	the	relationship	between	
self-respect	and	control	over	productive	resources.	See	O’Neill	2012,	75-100.	
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some	other	respect	‘unreasonable’?72	Are	we	then	similarly	contaminating	our	theory?	
For	 example,	 Lyng	 suggests	 that	 ‘edgework’	 is,	 in	 part,	 a	 response	 to	 a	 lack	 of	
opportunities	for	self-determination	and	self-actualization	within	modern	working	life.73	
Thus	 although	 ‘edgeworkers’	 do,	 in	 fact,	 gain	 in	 self-respect	 from	 their	 risk-taking	
activities,	 if	 Lyng	 is	 correct	 then	 there	 is	 something	 problematic	 about	 the	 conditions	
giving	rise	to	this	effect.	
We	have	two	responses	to	this	kind	of	worry.	First,	insofar	as	we	are	offering	an	internal	
critique	of	Tomasi,	 the	empirical	 strategy	 is	appropriate.	Tomasi	presents	his	 theory	as	
building	 out	 of	 observation	 of	 the	 actual	 concerns	 and	 experiences	 of	 citizens	 in	
advanced	post-industrial	 societies.	However,	he	does	not	engage	with	data	 in	 the	way	
necessary	to	make	good	on	this	methodological	vision.	Secondly,	and	more	generally,	if	
we	want	the	notion	of	self-respect	to	play	an	independent	role	in	our	theory,	then	we	do	
best	 to	 start	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 actual	 social	 bases	 of	 self-respect.	 What	 are	 the	
alternatives?	 The	 first	 is	 pure	 speculation	 about	where	 citizens	would	 get	 self-respect	
under	 more	 ideal	 conditions.	 We	 have	 already	 seen	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 construct	
contrasting,	yet	plausible	sounding	stories	about	the	relationship	between	risk	and	self-
respect.	 To	move	 beyond	 this	 storytelling,	we	 need	 empirical	 evidence.	Of	 course	 the	
																																								 																				
72	 The	‘unreasonableness’	objection	takes	at	least	two	distinct	forms.	Often	what	is	meant	is	that	a	
particular	way	of	deriving	self-respect	necessarily	makes	self-respect	unavailable	to	some	people,	by	
attaching	self-respect	to	an	inherently	competitive	or	comparative	characteristic	(e.g.	relative	height).	
In	a	second	form,	the	objection	holds	that	a	means	of	deriving	self-respect	may	be	generally	effective,	
but	is,	in	some	other	terms,	undesirable.	For	example,	Doppelt	expresses	both	of	these	concerns	
without	clearly	distinguishing	them	–	see	Doppelt	2009,	141-3.	
73	 Lyng	1990,	871	and	876-77.	
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sources	 of	 self-respect	might	 change	 with	 social	 and	 political	 conditions,	 but	 utilizing	
empirical	evidence	is	the	best	way	of	developing	some	plausible	hypotheses	about	how	
self-respect	 would	 behave	 in	 different	 contexts.	 Thus	 although	 Tomasi	 could	 respond	
that	 he	 is	making	 a	 claim	 about	 the	 social	 bases	 of	 self-respect	 under	 counterfactual	
conditions	of	 free	market	 fairness,	he	would	need	 to	 show	why	we	 should	expect	 the	
current	relationship	with	economic	risk	to	be	reversed.	We	do	not	find	such	an	account	
in	Tomasi.	
The	second	alternative	to	empirical	investigation	is	philosophical	assertion	about	where	
people	ought	to	get	self-respect.	But	if	we	push	the	‘unreasonableness’	objection	too	far	
in	 this	direction,	we	become	vulnerable	 to	 the	objection	 that	 self-respect	 is	no	 longer	
contributing	anything	to	the	specification	of	the	conditions	of	a	just	society,	rather	it	 is	
parasitic	 on	 a	 prior	 theory	 of	 justice.	 Once	 we	 have	 understood	 how	 self-respect	 is	
actually	 derived,	 we	 might	 subsequently	 identify	 certain	 of	 these	 patterns	 as	
problematic.	 Hence	 our	 empirical	 approach	 does	 not	 foreclose	 the	 possibility	 that	we	
should	 seek	 to	 reshape	 some	 aspects	 of	 the	 social	 bases	 of	 self-respect,	 rather	 than	
accepting	them	as	given	(although	again	empirical	evidence	is	required	to	tell	us	about	
the	likely	success	of	any	such	strategy).	We	do	not	claim	that	empirical	evidence	of	the	
kind	brought	forth	here	should	have	the	last	word	in	philosophical	argument	about	the	
social	bases	of	self-respect.	But	it	does	provide	an	important	starting	point.	
V.	CONCLUSION	
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In	his	account	of	the	changing	nature	of	modern	working	life,	Richard	Sennett	describes	
a	business	manual	that	‘domesticates	the	heroism	of	risk’;	it	depicts	a	world	of	work	in	
which	 risk	 ‘becomes	normal	 and	ordinary’.74	 Sennett’s	observation	nicely	 captures	 the	
mistake	in	Tomasi’s	view	of	the	relationship	between	risk	and	self-respect.	Tomasi	is	right	
to	 think	 that	 risk	 can	 bring	 important	 benefits	 in	 terms	 of	 individual	 self-concept:	
research	 into	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 ‘cultivated	 risk-taking’	 bears	 this	 out.	 However,	 he	
mistakenly	transplants	this	vision	of	the	value	of	risk	to	the	economic	domain,	where	risk	
is	typically	unchosen	and	pervasive;	often	feels	uncontrollable	and	involves	high-stakes.	
In	 this	 context,	we	have	 shown	 that	 the	experience	of	 risk	 tends	 to	undermine	 rather	
than	support	individual	self-respect.	The	wider	message	of	this	paper	is	that	we	should	
move	beyond	 the	 construction	of	 plausible	 sounding	 stories	 about	 the	 social	 bases	of	
self-respect,	to	engage	in	the	messy	empirical	business	of	testing	our	theories.	
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FIGURES	
	
Figure	 1.	 Expected	 probabilities	 of	 a	 typical	 respondent	 reporting	 having	
self-respect	 as	 self-reported	 chance	 of	 job	 loss	 increases.	 Shaded	 areas	
indicate	95%	confidence	intervals.		
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Figure	 2.	 Expected	 probabilities	 of	 a	 typical	 respondent	 reporting	 having	
self-respect	 as	 occupation-gender	 specific	 unemployment	 risks	 increase.	
Shaded	areas	indicate	95%	confidence	intervals.	
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Figure	 3.	 Expected	 probabilities	 of	 a	 typical	 respondent	 reporting	
having	self-respect	as	the	risk	associated	with	specific	skills	 increases.	
Shaded	areas	indicate	95%	confidence	intervals.		
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Figure	 4:	 Expected	 probabilities	 of	 a	 typical	 respondent	 reporting	
having	 self-respect	 as	 subjective	 unemployment	 risk	 increases.	 The	
solid	line	shows	the	probabilities	for	those	who	enjoy	taking	risks,	the	
dashed	line	those	who	do	not.	Shaded	areas	indicate	95%	confidence	
intervals.		
